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Implementing the Biosafety Protocol: 
Key Challenges
Robert Falkner and Aarti Gupta 
Summary
• The Cartagena Protocol is becoming a global source of rules and norms for
GMO trade but important elements will need to be negotiated by the
parties to make it a more comprehensive regulatory system. 
• The most urgent task is to agree upon rules on identifying GMO content
in bulk agricultural trade, which is central to importing countries’ ability to
carry out risk assessment and implement domestic regulations on GMO
traceability and labelling. 
• The parties will have to decide on how the compliance mechanism is to
work. Proposals for a sanctions-based approach in this context have proved
to be highly controversial. 
• Parties also need to consider the financial implications arising from cases
of non-compliance, as part of the wider need to promote effective capacity-
building in developing countries.
• In negotiating these elements, the existing parties (mainly GMO-importing
countries) face a strategic trade-off: whether to push ahead with their
implementation agenda or seek a broader consensus, including with (non-
party) GMO-exporting countries.
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Introduction
Four years after its adoption and one year after its
entry into force, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is
on its way to becoming a key global source of rules
and norms for trade in genetically modified organisms
(GMOs).  However, certain important elements that
would make it a comprehensive regulatory system are
still being negotiated and a number of other agreed
elements await full implementation.  To be sure, no
multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) has ever
been created in toto, without needing revision or
elaboration.  International regime-building can be an
arduous, lengthy and often frustrating effort.  The key
challenge now is for the biosafety treaty to evolve in a
manner that is seen as legitimate and practical by both
exporters and potential importers of genetically
modified organisms.  
In moving towards full implementation, the parties
to the protocol have to spell out detailed requirements
for identifying genetically modified (GM) varieties in
the bulk agricultural commodity trade; define and
elaborate on procedures for the functioning of the
newly created compliance mechanism; continue to
develop a coherent framework for capacity-building;
and embark on a lengthy negotiation of rules on
liability and redress in case of damage resulting from
trade in particular GMOs.  In late 2004, the number of
ratifications of the protocol passed 100, and more
countries have signalled their desire to join the treaty.
However, most current parties to the protocol
represent, on balance, the importer rather than the
exporter perspective on GMO trade.  Key GMO-
exporting countries, such as Argentina and Canada, are
still deliberating whether to ratify the agreement,
while others, particularly the United States, are
unlikely to accede to the agreement in the near future. 
In reaching decisions on controversial issues,
therefore, the existing parties face a fundamental
dilemma: whether to push ahead with stringent rules
on implementation, which might deter exporting
countries from ratifying; or whether to go slow and
seek a broad consensus, also with non-parties, on the
outstanding issues.  This dynamic between parties and
non-parties was particularly striking in the first
Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol, held
in Kuala Lumpur in February 2004.  This briefing paper
reviews the progress made so far in making the
Cartagena Protocol operational and outlines the
pressing implementation challenges that the protocol
now faces. 
Background to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety1
Genetic engineering is seen by many as a revolutionary
technological advance in agriculture.  Unlike
traditional methods of plant and animal breeding,
genetic engineering allows the direct manipulation of
genetic material in plants and animals, through
inserting, removing or altering genes.  This new
technology permits both genetic change across the
boundaries of species and a more rapid and targeted
form of modification.  The nature and relative novelty
of this technology have, however, given rise to a fierce
international debate over the desirability and safety of
genetic engineering in agriculture and food
production. 
Much of the opposition to genetic engineering in
agriculture reflects concern over the ecological impacts
of the release of GMOs into the environment or
human health impacts of consuming food with GM
content.  Environmentalists and consumer advocates
are concerned about the potential long-term effects of
GMOs on ecosystems and human health, and urge
policy-makers to be guided by caution.  Developed and
developing countries have also voiced concerns about
the potential impact the new technology would have
on their agricultural systems and communities.  Many
see genetically modified crops as unsuitable for small-
scale subsistence farmers in poor countries and fear
large multinational companies will dominate seed
production and distribution.  These concerns prompted
international efforts to create a global biosafety treaty,
leading to the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) in January 2000.
The biosafety negotiations
The Cartagena Protocol is the first international treaty
dealing with the transboundary movement of
genetically modified organisms.  After its 50th
ratification last year, the treaty entered into force on
11 September 2003.  The Cartagena Protocol is the
result of nearly four years of at times acrimonious
negotiations between GMO-exporting and -importing
countries. What started as a relatively unnoticed set of
multilateral negotiations in 1996 was soon catapulted
into the limelight of the global trade–environment
conflict, mainly owing to the growing controversies
over genetic engineering in agriculture in the late
1990s.2 Developing countries’ concerns about their
ability to manage biotechnology and the European
Union’s (EU) precautionary stance on GMOs in
agriculture provided the main impetus for creating
stringent international biosafety rules.  The small but
powerful Miami Group of GMO exporters, comprising
the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Chile
and Uruguay, initially opposed these but eventually
accepted a compromise agreement in January 2000. 
The main objective of the Cartagena Protocol is to
contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of
living modified organisms (LMOs).3 Despite its coverage
of human health- and biodiversity-related safety
aspects of LMOs, the emphasis is on ensuring safety in
the transboundary movement of LMOs.  The protocol is
thus both an environmental and a trade agreement,
insofar as it explicitly regulates the international trade
in genetically modified material.  The domestic use of
LMOs remains largely in the hands of national
regulatory authorities, although the protocol provides
guidance and assistance in this area. 
It is expected that the Cartagena Protocol will be of
central relevance for developing countries, many of
which are only now beginning the process of
developing domestic biosafety regulations.  The
protocol provides these countries with guidelines for
carrying out risk assessment, strengthens their
sovereign right to subject international trade in GMOs
to such risk assessment and supports the creation of
regulatory institutions through capacity-building and
information exchange.  Capacity-building initiatives are
currently under way to support the creation of
national biosafety frameworks, provide training on risk
assessment and management, and boost scientific and
regulatory capacity in general.
Key provisions of the protocol
The central regulatory element of the biosafety treaty
is the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure,
which applies to the first intentional transboundary
movement of LMOs for intentional introduction into
the environment of the importing country.4 The
procedure seeks to ensure that importing countries
have the opportunity to assess the environmental or
human health risks associated with the LMO before
agreeing to its import.  It obliges exporters to notify
importers in advance of the first shipment and to
supply a detailed description of the LMO.  After
acknowledging receipt of the information within 90
days, the importing party must communicate its
decision, which is to be based on risk assessment,
within 270 days: it may approve or prohibit the import,
request further information or extend the deadline by
a defined period of time, stating the reasons for the
decision.  Both the importing and exporting parties
may, at any time, initiate a review of the decision in
the light of new scientific information. 
Although applying to all LMOs in principle, the
Cartagena Protocol exempts certain types of LMOs
either from the entire agreement or from specific
provisions.  Article 5 excludes the transboundary
movements of LMOs which are pharmaceuticals for
humans from all provisions of the agreement.5 Among
the LMOs exempted from the AIA procedure are LMOs
in transit and LMOs destined for contained use in
accordance with the standards of the Party of Import
(Article 6); and LMOs intended for direct use as food or
feed or for processing (LMO-FFPs) (Article 7.3).  The
latter represent the vast majority of internationally
traded LMOs – so-called agricultural commodities – and
were the subject of protracted negotiations in the final
stage of the biosafety talks.  A simplified procedure
was agreed for commodities, which creates certain
information requirements for exporting countries but
not a requirement for country-by-country prior
notification (see discussion below).  The protocol does
not, however, affect the right of any party to regulate
any of these exempted LMOs through domestic
legislation.  Likewise, parties can inform the Biosafety
Clearing-House that they wish to exempt certain
imports of LMOs from the AIA procedure (Article 13),
and the Conference of the Parties to the CBD serving
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol
(COP/MOP, the decision-making body) may in future
decide to exempt additional LMOs from application of
the AIA procedure.
The protocol requires importing countries to base
their decision on risk assessment, which is to be carried
out ‘in a scientifically sound manner’ (Article 15).
Specific guidelines for risk assessment are detailed in
Article 15 and Annex III of the agreement.  During the
negotiations, developing countries demanded the right
to take into account socio-economic considerations,
which Article 26 permits, provided that this is
consistent with other international obligations.  A
hotly contested question in the negotiations was the
extent to which the precautionary approach should be
applied in decision-making.  The compromise reached
allows importing countries to take a decision – for
example to ban LMO imports – where there is a lack of
relevant scientific information and knowledge about
adverse effects (Article 11.8).  The inclusion of
precautionary language in the operational text of the
agreement marks a significant advance in international
environmental law towards a more formal recognition
of the precautionary principle.  It also serves to
strengthen the prerogative of importing nations to
decide on whether or not to allow LMO imports into
their territory.
On the basis of Article 18.3 of the CBD, the protocol
also establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House as the
central mechanism for the exchange of scientific,
technical, environmental and legal information on
LMOs covered by the protocol (Article 20).  It is
designed to assist parties in implementing the protocol
and to provide them with speedy access to relevant
information in order to carry out risk assessment.  The
clearing-house will play a critical role in providing
access to information on agricultural commodities
placed on the market and on legislation by importing
countries regarding their import.  A detailed overview
of the protocol’s information-sharing obligations is
provided in Table 1.
Progress since adoption of the biosafety
treaty
As it stands, the biosafety treaty is still very much in a
state of evolution.  Many contentious issues were left
unresolved in the final round of the biosafety
negotiations in January 2000, including detailed rules
on identification of GMOs in trade, coordinated
capacity-building for developing countries, compliance
and enforcement mechanisms, and rules on liability.
These and other issues will now have to be addressed by
successive meetings of the parties over the next few
years.  At the first such meeting, held in early 2004 amid
growing controversy over GMO trade, the parties took
important steps towards implementation of the
protocol. 
Between the adoption of the protocol in 2000 and
its entry into force in 2003, an Intergovernmental
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Committee for the Cartagena Protocol (ICCP) met three
times to prepare for the first Meeting of the Parties.
While the ICCP could not take binding decisions on the
development of the protocol, it nevertheless helped to
get the Biosafety Clearing-House off the ground and
made recommendations on a long list of outstanding
issues.  When the First Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties
(COP/MOP-1) met in February 2004, an ambitious work
programme had thus been set.  But whether the first
meeting would succeed in reaching key decisions on
operational and institutional aspects of the treaty was
far from clear.
In the end, COP/MOP-1 proved to be a success.  The
fact that most GMO-exporting nations have yet to
ratify the agreement gave the existing parties an
opportunity to push ahead with their implementation
agenda.  But on the key issue relating to identification
of transgenic content in agricultural commodity
shipments, COP/MOP-1 could only agree on interim
rules that will need to be reconsidered at future
meetings.  The following sections discuss this and other
major issues of contention and potential options and
solutions in these areas.
Identifying GM content in
agricultural commodity trade 
Background
As pointed out above, the Cartagena Protocol contains
a special, simplified procedure for LMOs intended for
direct use as food or feed, or for processing (LMO-
FFPs).  Agricultural commodities make up the vast
TABLE 1: INFORMATION-SHARING OBLIGATIONS FOR DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF LMOS
Exporter obligations for information-sharing/soliciting importer
agreement 
In advance: Notification and solicitation of agreement from importing party
prior to transfer; detailed information about the LMO to be provided with
this notification.
With transfer: Documentation which clearly identifies them as LMOs,
and specifies their identity and relevant traits and/or characteristics;
requirements for safe handling, use and storage; contact point for further
information; declaration that transfer is in accordance with exporter’s
protocol obligations.   
In advance: Instead of country-by-country, notification to a centralized
Biosafety Clearing-House (BCH) of domestic approvals of LMOs that may
enter international trade in the future.  Information to be supplied to the
BCH includes approved domestic uses of the LMO and a risk assessment
report done in order to secure domestic approval.
With transfer: Documentation which clearly identifies that unsegregated
bulk agricultural commodity shipments ‘may contain’ LMOs; that they are
not meant for intentional introduction into the environment; contact point
for information.  This is subject to further negotiations.   
In advance: No obligations.
With transfer: Documentation that clearly identifies them as LMOs;
requirements for safe handling, transfer and use; contact point for further
information.    
In advance: No obligations.
With transfer: No obligations.
Where appropriate, an obligation on all parties to provide regulatory
information or summary risk assessments about LMO products to Biosafety
Clearing-House. 
Category of LMOs
LMOs transferred for intentional
introduction into the
environment
LMOs transferred for food, feed
or processing (agricultural
commodities)
LMOs transferred for contained
use
Transfers of processed products
deriving from LMOs
Source: Table 2 in Aarti Gupta, ’Information as Influence in Anticipatory Governance: The Case of Biosafety’, in
Ronald B. Mitchell et al., Global Environmental Assessments: Information, Institutions and Influence (Cambridge:
MIT Press, forthcoming).
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majority of transnational GMO shipments and are
therefore of particular commercial significance to both
exporting and importing nations.  An estimated 300
million tonnes of grains, oilseeds, pulses and other
crops are traded internationally each year, and the
ongoing liberalization of agricultural markets is likely
to increase farm trade in the future.  Since the mid-
1990s, the share of GM crops in agricultural markets
has risen steadily, raising concerns among exporters
that stricter biosafety rules may act as protectionist
trade barriers.
FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN COMMERCIAL USE OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS (1996–2003)
Source: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications: www.isaaa.org.
The Cartagena Protocol’s rules on LMO-FFPs oblige a
party to inform other parties through the Biosafety
Clearing-House of its decision to authorize domestic
use of LMOs that may be subject to transboundary
movement.  On the basis of this information, importing
parties take a decision on whether or not to accept the
import of such commodities.  The main difference
between this and the AIA procedure is that, in the case
of agricultural commodity shipments containing LMO-
FFPs, exporters do not need to notify and inform
importing parties directly, and the prior approval
requirement does not automatically apply.  However,
importing parties may subject agricultural commodity
imports to a domestic procedure similar to AIA,
including prior notification and approval.  Moreover,
Article 11.8 of the protocol allows importing countries
to apply the precautionary approach in reaching a
decision on LMO-FFPs.  It is worth mentioning that,
because of the specific focus of the protocol on living
modified organisms, the procedure for LMO-FFPs does
not apply to all categories of what are generally
referred to as GM foods.  It does not cover trade in
food products that are derived from GM products but
do not contain an LMO (e.g. processed food made with
a refined processed oil derived from GM soya).
Debates and decisions at COP/MOP-1 in
Kuala Lumpur
The question of how to identify GM content in
agricultural commodity shipments was the final
stumbling block that nearly derailed the biosafety talks
in 2000.  A last-minute compromise reached in the final
hours of negotiation allowed the protocol to be
concluded.  The compromise called for bulk
agricultural commodity shipments containing
transgenic varieties to state that they ‘may contain’
LMOs (rather than specifying which ones or providing
any additional information).  The compromise further
stated that more detailed information requirements
were to be decided by the parties to the protocol not
later than two years after its coming into force (see
Box 1).  Not surprisingly, then, elaborating on the ‘may
contain’ requirement for bulk commodity trade was at
the centre of conflict at COP/MOP-1.  Exporting
countries and industry argued that there was no need,
at present, to go beyond the ‘may contain’ obligation.
Others, including the EU and developing countries,
pushed to elaborate and expand on this obligation.  In
the end, another compromise was struck: the main
obligation on exporters was still restricted to the need
to state that shipments ‘may contain’ LMOs, but parties
and others were ‘urged’ to provide additional detailed
information.  The parties also decided to establish an
open-ended technical expert group to further
elaborate on identification requirements for
agricultural commodities and adopted terms of
reference for its work.  COP/MOP-1 thus put in place an
interim solution but critical issues relating to
identification requirements remain to be decided by
the next meeting of the parties.
As before, negotiations over identification and
documentation requirements for bulk commodity
shipments pitted GMO exporters against potential
importer nations.  Two questions proved particularly
controversial: what kind of information exporters have
to supply, and in what form this information is to be
provided.  With regard to the former, the majority of
the parties demanded detailed information, including
the names of the LMOs concerned and details about
genetic transformation events.  The EU and most
BOX 1: CARTAGENA PROTOCOL, ARTICLE
18.2(A): HANDLING, TRANSPORT, PACKAGING
AND IDENTIFICATION
2. Each Party shall take measures to require that documentation
accompanying 
(a) living modified organisms that are intended for direct use
as food or feed, or for processing, clearly identifies that they
‘may contain’ living modified organisms and are not intended
for intentional introduction into the environment, as well as a
contact point for further information.  The Conference of the
Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to this Protocol
shall take a decision on the detailed requirements for this
purpose, including specification of their identity and any
unique identification, no later than two years after the date of
entry into force of this Protocol; 
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developing countries view this as an important
condition for carrying out risk assessments and
facilitating traceability systems.  In contrast, industry
groups and the delegations representing exporter
interests were keen to keep the required information
to a minimum and argued for maintaining the existing
requirement merely to state that shipments ‘may
contain’ LMOs.  This, they insisted, would allow
importing nations to consult relevant information on
authorized LMOs in exporting nations supplied
through the Biosafety Clearing-House.  On the
question of how this information is to be provided, the
GMO-exporting nations rejected demands for the
introduction of separate documentation in favour of
the use of existing commercial invoices to indicate the
presence of LMO content in shipments. 
Because most of the GMO-exporting nations have
not yet ratified the agreement, they were able only to
express their reservations but not to exercise a veto
over these proposals.  Brazil and Mexico, which are
parties, emerged, however, as opponents of more
stringent requirements relating to agricultural
commodities at COP/MOP-1.  Their perspectives signal
important and on-going shifts in alliances across
developed and developing countries.  Brazil, in
particular, is one of the large developing countries
with both importer and exporter concerns, while
Mexico has to contend with the fact that it is party to a
protocol that its main trading partners, the United
States and Canada, are not. 
In the end, the Kuala Lumpur meeting could devise
only interim solutions.  Thus, COP/MOP-1 decided to
request the use of commercial invoices until the
question of a stand-alone document is finally decided.
Further, it decided merely ‘to urge’ parties to ensure
that the precise name and the transformation event
code of the LMO, and possibly its unique identifier (see
discussion below on identification requirements), be
declared in accompanying documentation.  The
working group established at COP/MOP-1 will take the
discussion on these issues forward, with a view to
reaching a final decision on the details of
documentation and identification requirements at
COP/MOP-2 (2005) and COP/MOP-3 (2006). 
The working group, which will meet for the first
time in March 2005, will have to deal with three key
issues, among others: 
• the form of documentation to accompany
agricultural commodity shipments, particularly
whether existing commercial invoices or a stand-
alone document will be required; 
• the content of the accompanying information,
and particularly the use of a unique identifier
system; and 
• the question of thresholds in identifying LMOs in
shipments.
Documentation requirements
On the question of accompanying documentation on
which LMO presence is to be declared, parties remain
divided, with industry groups arguing against the use
of separate documentation, which they see as creating
an additional and unnecessary bureaucratic burden.
Most developing countries are still keen to introduce a
requirement for a stand-alone document, although
they could not secure unstinting support from the EU
for this demand in Kuala Lumpur. 
A key rationale that developing countries offered
for a stand-alone document was that it would make it
easier for custom authorities to distinguish shipments
which may contain LMOs from the many transactions
(accompanied by commercial invoices) where no LMOs
were being traded.  In the absence of a stand-alone
document, all relevant commercial invoices would have
to be examined to locate information about LMO
content.  Norway (as a vocal supporter of the
developing-country demand for a stand-alone
document) distributed a template in Kuala Lumpur
that countries could, in their individual capacity, post
on the Biosafety Clearing-House as their preferred
form of documentation to accompany LMO-FFPs in
trade.  This conflict again points to an on-going
dynamic in the overall protocol negotiation and
evolution: whether the extra financial or human
resource-related burdens of distinguishing between
GM and non-GM shipments should fall on exporters or
importers. 
It points, furthermore, to the all-important issue of
trust among different entities involved with GM trade.
Developing countries (supported by NGOs) distrust
corporate intentions in opposing a stand-alone
document, while agricultural traders fear that the use
of a stand-alone document would attach a ‘stigma’ to
GMO shipments.  It remains to be seen whether
COP/MOP-2 can find a solution which addresses such
concerns, while ensuring that a harmonized policy
emerges.  It would be an undesirable outcome for all if
individual countries started posting different stand-
alone documents on the Biosafety Clearing-House as
their preferred options. 
Identification requirements
As regards content, the parties are also equally divided
between those that want the accompanying
documentation to provide detailed information about
the identity of any LMO contained in a shipment,
preferably using a unique identifying system, and
those, including industry groups, that oppose detailed
identification requirements.  Agricultural traders argue
that the reality of the mingling of GM and non-GM
varieties in the grain harvesting, storage and
transportation system, together with the possibility of
adventitious presence of GM content, make
identification of every genetic transformation event in
a large commodity shipment near-impossible.  They
point further to the lack of an internationally
harmonized sampling and testing system and the
difficulty of establishing with sufficient certainty the
presence of minute quantities of GMOs.  It is certain
that this issue will prove one of the sticking points in
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the forthcoming Meeting of the Parties next year.
A first step towards finding a compromise was
made when at COP/MOP-1 the EU proposed the use of
the OECD’s unique identification system in this context.
The OECD’s work on unique identifiers for transgenic
plants, which is often compared to the ISBN system in
the publishing world, was developed with the help of
experts from GMO-exporting nations and has found
the support of some industry groups, particularly in
Europe.  The unique identifier consists of a single
alphanumeric code based on the genetic
transformation event, which can be used to access
more detailed information held in relevant databases
such as the Biosafety Clearing-House.  Although trade
associations such as the International Grain Trade
Coalition oppose the use of unique identifiers in
accompanying documentation – but support it as part
of the information supplied to the Biosafety Clearing-
House – the EU’s adoption of the OECD unique
identifier for certain products may set a precedent that
will shape markets before an international agreement
is reached.  It is as yet the most promising answer to
the question of identification, although it will need to
be extended beyond transgenic plants to cover all
LMOs that fall under the protocol’s scope.  If
developing countries can agree to a technical system
that was developed by the OECD rather than a more
inclusive international organization such as UNCTAD,
the South’s preferred institutional host, then a broad
coalition in favour of the unique identifier system may
emerge at the next COP/MOP.
The question of thresholds
Critical to the success of the future negotiations on
agricultural commodities will be a broad agreement on
the question of thresholds in identifying LMO content
in shipments.  This is by far the most controversial and
difficult issue on the agenda for the parties.
Substantial negotiations on this issue have yet to start,
and in all likelihood COP/MOP-2 will leave it to be
resolved at the next COP/MOP in 2006.  Setting a
threshold for identifying LMO presence in shipments
will be of great commercial significance to agricultural
producers and traders; it will also, in large measure,
determine the future relevance of the Cartagena
Protocol and its attempts to balance importers’ right to
know with exporters’ interest in a commercially
workable system.
Industry groups have pushed for a 5 per cent
threshold to be applied across the board for all types
of LMO shipments, which would mean that the
identification requirement applied only to shipments
containing 5 per cent or more of LMO content.  This,
they argue, would be a realistic level that would limit
the disturbance caused to existing commodity trade
flows.  It would guarantee that adventitious presence
of GM content, which may result from cross-pollination
or accidental mixing of seed during production and
conditioning, does not cause shipments to be
identified as ‘containing LMOs’.  LMO-exporting
nations such as Canada and the United States support
the industry view and also recommend a 5 per cent
threshold, which was included in a controversial
trilateral agreement between the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries of Mexico, the
United States and Canada.  But while the 5 per cent
threshold may be commercially viable, it is considered
by many parties to be unacceptable. 
Some parties have already established thresholds
for domestic labelling regimes, and the variety of
approaches chosen so far is likely to complicate the
search for an international standard.  The EU’s labelling
and traceability rules, which entered into force in April
2004, require that all food and feed containing GMOs,
and food produced from or containing ingredients
produced from GMOs, be labelled as containing GMOs.
In the case of adventitious presence of GMOs, any
product containing more than 0.9 per cent of approved
GM material is to be considered a GM product.  A 0.5
per cent threshold applies for adventitious presence of
GMOs not yet formally authorized.  Australia and New
Zealand have adopted a threshold of 1 per cent, South
Korea 3 per cent, and Japan and Indonesia 5 per cent.
Russia is to lower its 5 per cent threshold to 0.9 per
cent and China has recently introduced a zero per cent
threshold for its labelling scheme.  Moreover, the
existing national rules differ not only with regard to
the tolerance level for GMO presence but also with
regard to the GMOs and GM products covered.  As
countries will want to see their domestic regulations
supported by international rules, finding a compromise
on thresholds is likely to prove one of the most
controversial aspects of the next two COP/MOPs.
Compliance mechanism
Background
In principle, all parties to an international treaty should
have an interest in strong compliance mechanisms, to
ensure full implementation and prevent free-riding by
the few at the cost of the many.  In practice, however,
most multilateral environmental agreements use 
only ‘soft’ mechanisms that seek to facilitate
implementation through creating transparency and
providing assistance.  The possibility of taking stronger,
even punitive, measures in cases of non-compliance
remains the exception in MEAs. Environmental treaty-
making has thus developed a practice of creating
compliance mechanisms that are non-judicial, non-
adversarial, participatory and of a facilitative nature.
These procedures aim at preventing disputes arising
from instances of non-compliance and at clarifying the
application of MEA rules and provisions.
Debates and decisions at Kuala Lumpur
At COP/MOP-1 in Kuala Lumpur, developing countries
expressed concerns about proposed language that
sought to strengthen the biosafety protocol’s
compliance mechanism, to include the possibility of
punitive sanctions against non-compliers.  Developing
countries, in particular, were concerned that they
might be faced with punitive measures in the event of
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capacity-related non-compliance.  Outspoken
opposition to strong compliance rules also came from
GMO-exporting nations, most of which as non-parties
were, however, not able to block final decisions.  The
controversial issues included: who would be entitled to
initiate the compliance procedure; in what capacity the
members of the compliance body – the Compliance
Committee – would serve; what information they
would be able to consider and from whom; and what
kinds of measures could be used against non-compliant
countries.
The EU pushed for adoption of strong provisions
that included the right of all parties to trigger the
compliance procedure and the possibility of taking
sanctions against persistently non-compliant parties.
The EU further demanded that members of the
Compliance Committee serve in their personal capacity
rather than as representatives of governments. Some
elements of the EU’s proposal provoked strong
objections, especially the use of punitive measures.
Developing countries called for a recognition of 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated
responsibilities’ in compliance decisions, while GMO-
exporting countries demanded a balance of exporter
and importer perspectives in Compliance Committee
membership.  In the end, the parties agreed to
TABLE 2: COMPLIANCE ISSUES AT COP/MOP-1: AREAS OF CONFLICT AND OUTCOMES 
Controversial
issues 
South EU Miami Outcome in KL
Compliance based
on principle of
common but
differentiated
responsibilities
(CDR)? 
YES NO NO No reference to
CDR; but special
needs of different
regions recognized
Balance between
exporter and
importer views on
committee?  
Not necessary Not necessary Necessary No overt balancing
of different views
required
Should members of
committee serve: 
As representatives
of their
governments
OR 
In their personal
capacity? 
Some prefer
members to
represent their
countries  
In their personal
capacity
Objectively and in
the best interests
of the protocol 
Members
nominated by
parties and elected
by COP/MOP must
serve ‘objectively
and in their
personal capacity’
Who can trigger
compliance
procedure?
Self-trigger
OR 
Party-to-party
Self-trigger and
party-to-party, as
long as both are
directly involved 
Party-to-party Self-trigger
(Australia); 
multilateral trigger
via the COP
(Canada) 
Both self- and
party-to-party
trigger (but only if
triggering party is
‘affected or likely
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OR 
Also from others
(NGOs, academics,
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From parties and
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sources.
No NGOs (China) 
Information from
all sources may be
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Information from
all sources may be
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From parties
Also from CBD,
COP/MOP, BCH, and
relevant
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organizations
Punitive measures? NO  
Only cooperative
measures 
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For repeated 
non-compliance 
NO
Only cooperative
measures 
Could not be
resolved.  
To be considered
by COP/MOP-3 
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establish a Compliance Committee consisting of 15
government-nominated members reflecting a regional
balance, who will serve ‘objectively and in a personal
capacity’.  This compromise language is taken from the
Basel Convention on trade in hazardous waste,
highlighting a phenomenon that negotiators remained
keenly aware of during protocol compliance
discussions: the precedent-setting nature of any one
MEA. 
On the critical issue of who can initiate non-
compliance proceedings, parties agreed that any party
can bring a case of non-compliance where it is itself
concerned (self-trigger) or where it is ‘affected or likely
to be affected, with respect to another Party’ (party-to-
party trigger).  The Compliance Committee can
consider relevant information submitted by concerned
parties but also from other sources, such as
international organizations.  In cases of non-
compliance, it is the COP/MOP that will decide on
measures to be taken, based on recommendations
from the committee.  These may include provision of
assistance, issuing a caution and publishing the case
through the Biosafety Clearing-House. 
On the highly contentious question of punitive
measures in cases of persistent non-compliance, the
parties failed to reach a consensus and left the issue
for future COP/MOPs to decide.  Only the EU pushed
hard for possible punitive measures for repeated non-
compliance.  It remained somewhat unclear
throughout the discussions whose non-compliance the
EU was most worried about: was it exporting-country
non-compliance, as might be intuitively assumed, or
was it rather the spectre that exporting countries
would trade in LMOs with non-compliant importing
countries, most likely developing countries which are
parties to the protocol?  In either case, the option of
punitive sanctions is seen by some as particularly key
for the biosafety protocol, because the protocol does
not prohibit trade with non-parties, unlike the
Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion and the Basel
Convention on trade in hazardous waste.  Indeed,
instead of prohibiting trade with non-parties, the
protocol permits bilateral agreements between parties
and non-parties, although it requires that such trade
be consistent with the objectives of the protocol.  In
this context, a strong compliance mechanism (with the
possibility of trade restrictions as a punitive measure)
acquires much greater importance. 
Challenges and opportunities ahead
Now that the Compliance Committee has been
established and will probably meet for the first time in
March 2005, what are the challenges it faces?  Two 
key issues that may affect its functioning and
effectiveness are: (a) how the incentives to bring a case
before the Compliance Committee will develop, which
will influence how busy or idle it will be; and (b) how
the committee’s recommendations will be financed.
Regarding the first issue, it is interesting to
speculate on whether the Compliance Committee will
be flooded with cases or have very few brought before
it.  The Basel Convention Compliance Committee has
not had a single case submitted to date; in contrast,
the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention6
has received numerous cases, partly because civil
society groups are able to trigger the compliance
procedure.  Either scenario poses its own challenges,
with consequences for effective compliance with the
protocol.  How busy the Compliance Committee might
be is at least partly linked to the controversial issue of
punitive sanctions, which as noted above remains to be
decided.  If compliance remains purely facilitative and
cooperative, this may provide an incentive for greater
numbers of self-trigger cases, by countries that lack the
capacity to implement the protocol.  Self-triggering in
such cases would provide developing countries, in
particular, with another means to seek to enhance
their capacity to implement the protocol.  Although
this is, in itself, not necessarily a negative development
for the protocol or the Compliance Committee, the
underlying problem of inadequate capacity will need
to be addressed through capacity-building (see
discussion below). 
This leads directly to the second key issue: the
question of who will shoulder the burden for financing
committee recommendations, especially in cases of self-
trigger.  As stated in the final decision, the Compliance
Committee can recommend provision of technical
assistance or measures such as ‘drawing up a
compliance plan’.  Such recommendations are likely to
be costly to implement.  Who will foot the bill?  Since
there has been no specific talk to date of a voluntary
fund, contributions will have to come from the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) as the protocol’s financial
mechanism or from contributions made by parties to
the protocol.  Yet most current parties are developing
countries, with the exception of the EU and some
OECD countries.  
This potential challenge to effective functioning of
the compliance mechanism is also a more general
challenge facing implementation of the protocol.
Currently, there is at least a three-tier stratification of
countries seeking to influence the evolution and
implementation of the protocol.  These include (a)
parties to the protocol; (b) countries that have signed
but not yet ratified the protocol; and (c) countries that
have neither signed nor ratified the protocol (and the
Convention on Biological Diversity in the case of the
United States).  This results in a situation where,
although rules are developed through negotiation and
compromise with all of the above groups, the burden
of implementation and particularly of financing falls
on parties.  Brazil, in particular, as one of the largest
current contributors to the protocol budget, has voiced
this concern.  This dynamic may affect the future
evolution of the protocol. 
Capacity-building and liability rules
The need for capacity-building in developing countries
was widely recognized in the biosafety negotiations
and remained uncontroversial during the preparations
for COP/MOP-1.  The Cartagena Protocol itself provides
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only a loose framework for international capacity-
building efforts.  Article 22 merely stipulates that
‘Parties shall cooperate in the development and/or
strengthening of human resources and institutional
capacities in biosafety’ and refers to ‘existing global,
regional, subregional and national institutions and
organizations’ as well as private-sector involvement as
vehicles for capacity-building.
The challenge for the parties is now to establish
greater coherence among the flurry of capacity-
building activities that have been started over the last
few years.  International organizations such as the GEF,
UN agencies, bilateral donor agencies, regional
networks, NGOs and industry groups have all offered
their support to developing countries in building
technical, scientific and regulatory capacity, causing
concern about potential duplication and even
competition between these initiatives.
The three ICCP meetings between 2000 and 2002
made good progress on developing interim guidelines
for internationally coordinated capacity-building in
biosafety.  Based on the ICCP’s recommendations,
COP/MOP-1 adopted interim guidelines on a Roster of
Experts, decided on an action plan and agreed to a
coordination mechanism, the functions of which will
be discharged by the protocol secretariat.  The only
time discussion on capacity-building became heated in
Kuala Lumpur was when the group of African
countries questioned the involvement of the private
sector, arguing that industry ought to be seen as part
of the problem, not part of the solution.  
What remains unclear, however, is the effect
capacity-building is going to have on the ground in
developing countries.  Critics have argued that
capacity-building programmes have been slow in
significantly improving developing countries’ ability to
carry out comprehensive risk assessment and
management.  Part of the problem is the sheer scale of
the capacity gap that needs to be filled.  Much of the
capacity to carry out field trials and monitor releases of
GMOs into the environment has to be created at the
local and regional level.  In large countries such as
China and India, this means that a vast number of
scientific and regulatory experts need to be trained
and funded – a task to which international assistance
can make only a small contribution.  For example,
Chinese environmentalists point out that while the
country has a national GMO approval system in place,
its ability to monitor the long-term effects of GMO
releases is severely limited.  While China is a leading
developing country in the development, testing and
commercialization of GM crops, most of its provincial
governments employ only one expert in charge of
biosafety monitoring.  It is unlikely, therefore, that
existing international capacity-building programmes
can fill the gap in this area. 
The need for greater financial support is likely to
grow even further as more countries ratify the protocol
and new capacity-building needs are identified.
Building up biosafety capacity requires training in a
wide range of areas and professions, including
scientists, lawyers, administrators, policy-makers,
customs authorities and enforcement agencies.
Moreover, future COP/MOP decisions may also increase
the demand for capacity-building: a future liability
regime would require additional capacity-related
activities, and should the Compliance Committee
recommend action plans in cases where non-compliant
parties have ‘self-triggered’ the compliance procedure,
the question of funding such plans would arise, as
discussed above.  
At the moment, no decision has been taken on how
such new capacity-building needs will be met.  A
voluntary fund has been mooted but no specific
proposals or commitments by donor countries have
been made.  Should the Global Environment Facility
not fill the gap, the default option may be greater
reliance on bilateral or private-sector initiatives in the
future, with the risk that these will focus selectively on
countries which are key markets for GM products,
leaving capacity needs elsewhere unmet.  The situation
is complicated by the fact that developing countries
are in a relatively weak bargaining position over
financial contributions, having been the main
demandeurs in the biosafety negotiations.  This
contrasts with the Montreal Protocol, where the large
donor countries had an interest in financing
implementation of the phase-out schedule for ozone-
depleting substances in the developing world and
provided generous financial contributions through the
Multilateral Ozone Fund.7 In the protocol, the financial
outlook is further complicated by the fact that
developing countries not yet party to it (such as
Argentina or Chile) are also demanding a share of
available resources from the protocol’s financial
mechanism to help them prepare for possible
ratification of the protocol. 
Towards a liability regime?
A key demand by developing countries in the biosafety
negotiations was the creation of a system for liability
and redress in the event of harm caused by a LMO.
Developing countries wanted to ensure that clear rules
existed on who can claim compensation from whom
and for what types of damage traded LMOs may cause
to the environment, human health and socio-economic
interests.  The demand was rejected by the developed
nations, and Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol
instead declared that COP/MOP-1 should ‘adopt a
process with respect to the appropriate elaboration of
international rules and procedures in the field of
liability and redress’, which is to be completed within
four years.  The scene was therefore set for a
straightforward decision by COP/MOP-1 to decide on
the procedural rules to launch a process for
elaborating a liability regime.  The Kuala Lumpur
meeting agreed terms of reference for an open-ended
ad hoc working group of legal and technical experts
on liability and redress that is to present its final report
on proposed international rules and procedures by
2007. 
However, the discussion in Kuala Lumpur revealed
once again the gulf that persists between proponents
and opponents of a liability regime.  Countries
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representing biotechnology industry or exporter
interests expressed concerns about, inter alia, the
ability to define incidents of damage caused by GMOs,
and to establish who is legally responsible for paying
compensation; the threat of co-mingling and
adventitious presence of GMOs in commodity
shipments, which might give rise to liability claims; and
how responsibility is to be allocated among the wide
range of actors involved in international GM trade,
including export and import authorities, biotechnology
firms, commodity traders, seed companies and farmers. 
This wide gulf on questions of liability was evident
in the views submitted by parties and major
stakeholders in response to a questionnaire, which is
intended to prepare the ground for the first meeting
of the technical group of experts on liability and
redress.8 At this stage, no consensus is in sight on
either the need to create a liability regime or the
contours and concepts of such a legal instrument.
With a deadline of 2007 for finishing its work, the
liability working group is unlikely to enter into any
serious negotiations very soon.  This can, of course,
change with market imperatives and biotechnology
product developments.  The Starlink controversy in the
US, which resulted from the discovery of unauthorized
GM corn in food products, made liability concerns
relating to lost export markets a reality that has to be
considered now by all parties involved in GM research
and production.  Observers point to another potential
future hotbed of liability concerns and claims relating
to GM crops: the increasing use of food crops to
manufacture pharmaceutical products.  The floodgates
of liability claims will open if such products
inadvertently enter the food chain.  Given the
enormous resistance of many to liability discussions
within the protocol, it appears unlikely that the
biosafety treaty will go further and faster than the
market dictates.  Nevertheless the global discussion
now has a clear institutional home, which is a
substantial step forward. 
Conclusions
In the face of continued controversy over GMO
regulation and international trade, the first Meeting of
the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol was a significant
step forward.  The fact that most GMO-exporting
nations, including the United States, Canada and
Argentina, have yet to ratify the agreement gave the
existing parties an opportunity to press ahead with
their implementation agenda.  Whether the Cartagena
Protocol can provide a comprehensive system of
biosafety governance remains to be seen.  Future
Meetings of the Parties will have to add more
components to the treaty, many of which remain
controversial.  But in taking further decisions over the
next few years, the parties will have to balance the
desire to strengthen the protocol with the need to
encourage ratification by some of the world’s largest
agricultural trading nations.
Encouraging wider participation, particularly by the
GMO-exporting nations, is in the interest of all parties:
it would strengthen the legitimacy of the biosafety
protocol and reduce the likelihood of conflicts
between parties and non-parties over the application
of the protocol’s rules.  Moreover, it would enlarge the
pool of potential donor countries to help with the
costs of treaty implementation and thus limit the
demands that are likely to be made on wealthier
parties from the South, such as Brazil.
But wider participation comes at a price.  The
biosafety negotiations nearly failed in 2000 because of
the wide gap between GMO-exporter and -importer
positions.  This gap is still clearly visible today.  With
parties such as Brazil and Mexico moving closer to
some of the positions of the Miami Group of GMO-
exporting countries – there has even been talk of the
emergence of a ‘Miami Plus’ group – the COP/MOP
process has to contend with all the old tensions as well
as new and shifting alliances.  Greater diversity of
interests among developing countries and future
ratification by members of the ex-Miami Group will
make decision-making on the outstanding issues more
difficult.  The next two meetings of the parties in 2005
and 2006, therefore, will prove to be of critical
importance to the future of the Cartagena Protocol.  
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